FORCES WHITE PAPER

How can FORCES assist in the ISR modeling efforts for FCS?

Attachment B - Scenario Catalog (2002)

 

1.  UK GAP/North American (Air Force) Air Defense

(UNCLASSIFIED and DoD SECRET/Collateral versions)

 

Technical Applicability:

Most mature and highly developed of all FORCES scenarios.  While this scenario represents Soviet nuclear threats reflecting Cold War Era strategies, scenario could readily be adapted to represent air assault/Interdiction of US air space from any major foreign power from any place on the globe.  Also valuable, due to its classified representation of defense assets, for examining various CONUS BMD defense plans including off-shore intercepts by naval platforms, anti-drug and anti-terrorist operations.

 

Mission Area:

CONUS (Air Force) air defense.   Provides strategic force laydown for air-breather attack against CONUS from Russian/Slavic area.  Bomber approach routes from:

·       Murmansk down UK Gap and across Atlantic

·       Forward Bases at Arctic Circle southward through Canada

·       NW Russia down Bering Strait to Pacific launch points

 

Geographic Area: Global

 

Epoch:  US-Soviet Cold War

 

Relevance and Applicability:

Current version of the scenario is generally irrelevant to DoD or NRO, but many of the features of this scenario could be easily migrated to other scenarios that are of current interest.  Includes two legs of strategic Triad and would easily accommodate addition of ICBM threats as part of detailed RED SIOP.  Can also easily be modified to Blue Preemptive/RED Retaliatory or with Blue Retaliatory added.

 

Adaptability:

Major feature is robust mix of airborne, space-borne, shipboard and ground-based sensors at relatively high fidelity levels with natural and man-made perturbations of sensors and communications.  Version delivered to AF/ESC had reasonable representation of fighter a/c, air surveillance a/c, bombers and cruise missile assets, weapon, sensor and communications, payloads and defensive procedures still routinely used by the Air Force for surveillance, ID and weapons control. The data parameters could be easily restored and made current for most US and Friendly assets and for many of the former Soviet Bloc assets used by nations considered hostile to US interests. 

 

Features that should be salvaged for future use:

·       Radar and other airborne and space-borne sensor models,

·       Various Correlator/Tracker software (Hughes JSS, Alpha-Beta, Nearest Neighbor, Kalman Filter, Multiple-Hypothesis Tracker if available from ESC delivery in 1992),

·       Aircraft motion utilities, engagement rules and signature attributes,

·       Platter software,

·       Mission Planning software and interfaces,

·       Runtime interactive displays, controls and interfaces to live systems,

·       RED/BLUE SIOP Planner,

·       Naval Battle Group representations including Off-carrier Operations, P-3 and ASW doctrine/tactics,

·       SOSUS representation

·                   CM launch points against paired US targets,

·                   the CONUS target list and other SALT Treaty nuclear site data,

·                   locations of coastal (JSS, NWS and others),

·                   FAA radar site data,

·                   US and international commercial flight routes,

·                   OTH-B sites and coverage areas and capabilities,

·                   attack routes for bombers and CMs,

·                   employment tactics and doctrine for weapons and countermeasures (e.g., chaff and jamming),

·                   CONUS and BLUE Force communications data (i.e., any STRATCAM data sets),

·                   Environmental data (e.g., Auroral Cap & f-layer data, scintillation, EMP and Nuclear effects)

·                   Other elements.

 

Addition of valid NTM elements to this or any other next-generation CONUS attack scenario provides opportunity to evaluate and demonstrate value of various space-based constellations to strategic/global and multi-theater operations and missions.

 

Availability:

Availability of delivered classified version to ESC in 1992 appears doubtful due to loss of corporate memory by ESC Air Defense Initiative Program when ADI budget line item was cancelled.  Current unclassified Tactical/Tactical2 databases that support UK GAP scenario need major clean up due to use as testing baseline for new development and training.  Many of the categories are incorrect and many of the data parameters are notional.

 

Source:         Unclassified “UK Gap” – CRC

                       Classified SECRET “ADISC2 Mass Attack” - VOLK Field CRTC

Contact:       Major Paul ‘THOR’ Hebner

                       (608) 427-1419

 

Notes/Comments:

Media for the SECRET version is most likely 8mm or 4mm tape. This may present problems with respect to reading devices, protocols and age of stored data.  Original source was delivered to Rome Labs and ESC and contained copies of working directories and files from Martin development team.  Rome Labs, in 1995/6, delivered a copy of the classified tape media to Volk Field, after the government had closed the ADI program and lost the delivered ADISC2 configuration baseline.  Martin Marietta in Denver also has no corporate record of the delivered configuration baseline due to loss of data during one of the many reorganizations that occurred since 1992. 

 

The current FORCES unclassified baseline was generally reconstructed using unclassified “safe-keeping” tapes that were maintained by individual members of the development team.   These tapes had directories that included in-progress updates and demonstration “knock-offs” as well as tailored data sets for special purpose requirements for government-sponsored Engineering Change Proposals/Orders and MMC business development efforts.  Given the size and number of files in the ADISC2/FORCES baseline, it was often difficult to identify the original delivered files and the most capable versions of some of the various modules, without the knowledge and advice of the directory owner (who, in some cases, was not available or who “forgot” details).

 

Paul Vogel has re-engineered and rebuilt the original Executive Module and revised the database structure numerous times to incorporate many technological advances and added applications that did not exist at the time of original delivery.  There may now be some significant compatibility issues that will need to be resolved if the 1992 classified version were to be restored to its tested operational status.


2.  DPG SW Asia/ "DS Air"

(UNCLASSIFIED and DoD SECRET/Collateral versions)

 

Technical Applicability:

Large-scale, theater-level scenario for representation of operations conducted to establish air supremacy and operations against enemy C4ISR elements, troop concentrations and supply/re-supply lines.  Primarily used by Deeply Buried and Hardened Target Defeat IPT to determine impact produced by introduction of Chemical-Biological Warfare (CBW) agents, delivered via scuds, on air sortie rates, organizational fighting effectiveness and mission success in the context of desert warfare.  Also used by DoD Space Architect at DoD SECRET and SCI levels of database security to evaluate introduction of alternative current and future space-based communications and surveillance architectures and processes on operation outcomes such as force exchange rates, tempo of battle and mission success.

 

Mission Area:

Operation Desert Storm/Lightening-like Air Superiority, Battlefield Interdiction, Close Air Support and Attack Operations including JSEAD with and without (w/ w.o.) movement of CMT, w/ w.o.  introduction of CBW agents, and w/ w.o. --- unmanned aircraft used as decoys to stimulate illumination of fixed or mobile enemy targets.

 

THE AIR WAR. Coalition Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps pilots, aircrews and support personnel joined in arguably the most powerful and successful air assault in the history of modern warfare. From "H-hour" on 17 January when the air campaign began, until the end of offensive combat operations 43 days later

Four carrier battle groups operated in the Persian Gulf, together with the two additional battle groups in the Red Sea.  These complemented the striking power of land-based coalition air forces in Saudi Arabia and other coalition Gulf states, and the USAF units in eastern Turkey. This effectively surrounded Iraq with strike capability and demonstrated the mobility, flexibility and firepower which naval forces bring to the battlefield.

Operating from six aircraft carriers, two large amphibious assault ships (LHAs), various other amphibious ships, plus ground bases and makeshift airstrips ashore, Coalition Air Force, Navy and Marine fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft comprised the air campaign. U.S. aircraft during the war flew more than 94,000 sorties.  More than 64,000 Air Force and Army rotary sorties were conducted. Approximately 1,000 Navy and Marine Corps aircraft joined the U.S. Air Force, Army and coalition partners to knock out the Iraqi military machine. In direct proportion to their numbers in the U.S. air inventory, Navy and Marine aircraft flew close to 30,000 sorties.

The air campaign was conducted in four phases. Phase I was to gain air superiority by destroying Iraq's strategic capabilities. That phase was accomplished within the first seven days. Phase II required the suppression of air defenses in the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations. During Phase III, the coalition airmen continued to service Phase I and II targets as needed, but also shifted emphasis to the field army in Kuwait. Finally, Phase IV entailed air support of ground operations.

At around 0300 (Persian Gulf time) 17 January, OPERATION DESERT STORM began with a coordinated attack which included more than 100 Tomahawk land attack missiles (TLAMs). TLAM launches were conducted from both the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf from nine cruisers, five destroyers, two battleships and two nuclear powered attack submarines. The top shooter was the destroyer USS Fife (DD 991) which fired 58 missiles. The initial barrage of over 100 TLAMs took out heavily defended targets in the vicinity of Baghdad and made a critical contribution to eliminating Iraqi air defenses and command and control capabilities. In all, 288 TLAMs were launched as part of the integrated air campaign.

The TLAM launches opened a carefully crafted joint strategic air campaign including wave after wave of coalition aircraft that began hammering strategic targets inside both Iraq and Kuwait.  Throughout the war, air strikes were conducted from six aircraft carriers operating in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf. USS America (CV 66) and USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71) departed Norfolk 28 December 1990, and arrived just in time for the beginning of DESERT STORM. They joined USS Midway (CV 41), USS Saratoga (CV 60), USS John F. Kennedy (CV 67) and USS Ranger (CV 61) who were already on station.

After blinding the enemy's early warning systems with EA-6B, F-15E, F-16 and other Coalition aircraft and destroying critical radar sites with high-speed anti-radiation missiles (HARM) fired from Navy tactical aircraft and Air Force F-4 Wild Weasels, allied aircraft poured into Iraq and began bombing command and control centers, Scud missile launchers and nuclear, biological and chemical weapons facilities. The Navy/Marine Corps team launched more than 80% of the HARM missiles that paved the way for the coalition attack.

On "D-day," four Navy Hornets from VFA-81, embarked in Saratoga, were on a bombing mission targeted against an Iraqi airfield when they detected two Iraqi MiG-21s seven miles away. They switched their F/A18 strike-fighters from bombing profile to air-to-air, and downed both aircraft using Sidewinder missiles. They then continued their mission and scored direct hits on the enemy airfield. That encounter produced the Navy's only air-to-air kills, while taking the versatile Hornet through its dual-rolled paces. All told, coalition aircraft scored 35 air-to-air fixed wing kills.

The Iraqi air force quickly went underground or flew to safe haven in neighboring Iran. Navy pilots from John F. Kennedy, flying a daytime mission over southwestern Iraq early in the offensive, said that a group of MiGs stayed 40 or 50 miles away, falling back and refusing to engage each time the U.S. planes advanced. It was a pattern repeated throughout the war. Each time Air Force or Navy crews energized the powerful, long-range AWG-9 radar in the F-14, Iraqi pilots turned away. In the course of the war, more than 234 Iraqi aircraft were taken out of the fight: 90 were destroyed in combat operations, 122 flew to Iran, ground forces captured 16 and six were non-combat losses.

The joint air campaign was successful beyond the most optimistic expectations. As full partners in that campaign, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps aviators flew from carriers and amphibious ships in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf, and from Saudi, Turkish and European bases ashore, from the day hostilities began until the cease-fire was ordered. Navy aircraft struck targets up to 700 miles distant, with Red Sea sorties averaging 3.7 hours in length, and Persian Gulf sorties averaging 2.5 hours. As was also the case for their ground-based Air Force counterparts, many flights lasted as long as five hours and virtually every flight required airborne refueling at both ends of the journey.

Critical to the success of all aviation missions was the role of electronic countermeasures, "jamming" or "defense suppression" aircraft. Navy EA-6B Prowlers determined threat location, then jammed and destroyed enemy radars. Navy defense suppression aircraft supported all U.S. and coalition forces-- in fact, availability of the EA-6Bs was a go/no-go criterion for many strike missions. If Navy defense suppression wasn't available, the missions didn't fly.

The presence of U.S. naval forces on both flanks of coalition land and air forces ashore complemented and enhanced the air/ground campaign. It helped ensure the continued flow of logistics throughout the war and provided the "insurance" which allowed the Gulf States to confidently participate in the coalition without fear of retaliation.  They continued the maritime interception campaign throughout the war. They supported the ground campaign with air power and naval gunfire.  To fully appreciate the contribution of the Navy and Marine Corps to the campaign ashore, one need only consider the large-scale models of Iraqi defenses discovered in Kuwait City. Those defenses were pointed seaward. Iraqi forces were committed to defend Kuwait against amphibious attack. This diversion of forces was a critical element in the overall campaign plan. It set the stage for coalition armored forces on the western flank to rapidly envelop the Iraqi forces facing seaward and southward towards the central thrust spearheaded by the Marines.

Air Force AWACS and Navy E-2C Hawkeyes operated around-the-clock in concert with coalition AWACs to keep track of Iraq's air force and provide air traffic control. Navy and Marine aircraft flew continuous combat air patrols to protect sealift ships and airfields, provide reconnaissance and on-call anti-surface strike capability.

U.S. Air Force, Marine Corps and Navy airborne tankers played a crucial role in the operation. Without airborne tankers, coalition warplanes wouldn't have been able to hit targets deep in Iraq. The large, land-based Air Force KC-10 and KC-131 tankers carried the bulk of the load. Coordination of the airborne tanking effort was superb.

While strike-fighters and bombers were doing their job, the Navy's shore-based P-3C Orions and carrier-based S-3 Vikings continued to patrol the shipping lanes. Specially equipped EP-3Es provided electronic reconnaissance. While performing routine surface reconnaissance in the northern Persian Gulf on 20 February, an S-3B from VS-32, based aboard the carrier America, became the first aircraft of that type to engage and destroy a hostile vessel using bombs. Guided by the Aegis cruiser USS Valley Forge (CG 50), the S-3 searched the area with its forward-looking infrared system and inverse synthetic aperture radar (ISAR), pin-pointed the position of the high-speed, heavily-armed craft, and sank it.

 

Geographic Area: Mid-east theater with Iraqi forces and targets

 

Epoch:  Replay of Operation Desert Storm/Lightening baseline with excursions out to 2010-2015 for selected force elements and architectures.

 

Relevance and Applicability:

A major feature of this scenario is its force representation at nearly all echelon levels.  The unclassified current version of this scenario can be easily made relevant with the addition of current and/or future versions of NTM, upon verification of data parameters used in the representation of the scenario air and ground-force assets, organizations and payloads.  This updated and verified scenario may then be used to evaluate contributions of space architectures on outcomes of a wide range of mission types, conducted in desert terrain and with climates and orientation typical of near-equatorial latitudes.  While the Mid-east is still a center of gravity for US military operations, the scenario suffers from the view that, particularly in simulation-assisted operational planning, we are “always fighting the last war”.

In conjunction with NE Asia/Korean DPG scenario, this scenario can be used to evaluate simultaneous or serially sequenced Multiple Theater of War (MTW) operations in phases from peacetime operations to build-up and initial entry into either theater (or both), through drawdown and exit from theater(s).

 

Adaptability:

Soviet-style and US-led Coalition force structures and doctrines at theater-level could be readily relocated to any other geographical area on the globe, with appropriate alternative lay-downs and doctrine/tactics made to accommodate specific terrain features.  Selected subsets of force elements and TO&Es at various levels within the theater have been used successfully in vignettes to support a number of programs and demonstrations.

 

 

Integration/Federation with other models

This and other FORCES scenarios (i.e., DPG Scenario for NE Asia/Korea) may be used in confederated executions with the SLIM Model legacy.  Such confederation will provide the customer with the ability to evaluate the contribution of NTM on logistics request management, port-to-port scheduling and delivery processes associated with the supply and re-supply (by air or sea transport) of critical military cargoes to globally dispersed operations.   SLIM has been modified, under a CRC-funded initiative, to allow its functions and outputs to be synchronized with events in FORCES, when executed in confederated scenarios.  Additional Application Protocol Interface (API) development work will be required to properly accommodate the mapping, dynamic handling and exploitation of SLIM inputs/outputs during a FORCES runtime execution.  As an example:

 

SLIM generates cargo packages and “bills of lading” based on units of classed airborne and sea-borne cargoes.  The type, size and quantity of these packages reflect, in some cases, requirements per soldier or per type/size of end-user organizational units involved in a military operation.  Also the availability of transports capable of moving certain types of packages is considered in scheduling loading, delivery and arrival of the packages. 

 

FORCES scenarios will dynamically present generated levels of demand for different classes of cargo subject to changes associated with rates of unit attrition, availability of various transports, changes in mission requirements, sequences and priorities of the operation, as the scenario unfolds. 

 

SLIM functions are not based on “closed-loop” process algorithms.  Therefore, proper interoperability between SLIM and FORCES requires identification of appropriate time-based or event-based “points of entry” among the applications and possible development of “bridging” code structures.  Such bridges may be required that will “trigger” appropriate changes in SLIM processing streams and associated object state changes maintained within SLIM so as to reflect introduction of FORCES-generated updates.  Instances of object entities will need to be created within the FORCES environment that reflect the state and availability at any given time of SLIM transport platforms.  If FORCES kills one or more of these platforms, feedback processes will be required that stimulate SLIM to update the state of lost packages as part of its overall  “cargo situation picture”.

 

Likewise, some additional application development may be required within the FORCES environment to properly exploit SLIM outputs.  Losses and delays of critical cargo will automatically reduce the fighting effectiveness of FORCES units in the current configuration baseline.  But reduction in specific unit performance can be invoked only after the destination port and lines of distribution to the end users have been established between SLIM and FORCES for each specific instance of SLIM-generated cargo.  At present, this assignment algorithm is not present, nor is the distribution network established at depot-level below port-of-entry, nor are the changes in demand generated by FORCES mapped to cargo packages that are in-process/in-route in SLIM.  After that mapping is accomplished, there will likely be other required modifications with respect to the package priority handling and delivery scheduling routines that currently exist in SLIM.

 

This capability is not envisioned for use in the Task 3 effort with respect to any of the tactical scenarios to be addressed.  Applicability to possible long-term program goals is assumed.  The estimated level-of-effort to generate a reasonable degree of FORCES-SLIM interoperability at the application level would be approximately 4-6 man-months.

 

Availability: 

The version of this scenario at the DoD SECRET level was used for the Deeply Buried and Hardened Target Defeat study and was delivered to the Office of Space Architect (before it was increased to the SCI control level with the addition of other data and scenario elements by that office).  It may be under CRC control as early as 14 JUL ’00.  There are some minor technical difficulties expected with the external hard drive that was configured as an external boot drive for a different SUN workstation than will be used for this program.  We expect to overcome this glitch within a week of delivery to the CRC facility.

 

Source:         Unclassified “DS Air” – CRC

 

Contact:        Classified SECRET “SWA” - VOLK Field CRTC

                       Major Paul ‘THOR’ Hebner or Capt. David Tessmer

                       (608) 427-1419

 

 

Notes/Comments:

We also expect some minor problems associated with revisions recently made to FORCES database structures to support new applications developed and implemented in support of the SMDC SSNORR, NMD and DTTRA programs.

 

 


3. DPG SW Asia/ "DS Ground"

(UNCLASSIFIED and DoD SECRET/Collateral versions)

 

Technical Applicability:

Large-scale, theater-level scenario for representation of ground operations similar to those performed in Operation Desert Shield/Storm.  Primarily used by Deeply Buried and Hardened Target Defeat IPT to determine impact produced by introduction of Chemical-Biological Warfare (CBW) agents, delivered via scuds, on organizational fighting effectiveness and mission success in the context of ground operations conducted in context of desert warfare.  Also used by DoD Space Architect at DoD SECRET and SCI levels of database security to evaluate introduction of alternative current and future space-based communications and surveillance architectures and processes on operation outcomes such as force exchange rates, tempo of battle and mission success.

 

Mission Area:

 “DS Ground” sub-scenario is the “Left Hook” maneuver and ground operations conducted over the days prior to cease-fire during the 1991 liberation of Kuwait, with close air support and battlefield interdiction.

 

Geographic Area: Mid-east theater with Iraqi forces, objectives and targets

 

Epoch:  Replay of Operation Desert Shield/Storm baseline with excursions out to 2010-2015 for selected force elements and architectures.

 

Relevance and Applicability:

A major feature of this scenario is its force representation at nearly all echelon levels.  The unclassified current version of this scenario can be easily made relevant with the addition of current and/or future versions of NTM, upon verification of data parameters used in the representation of the scenario air and ground-force assets, organizations and payloads.  This updated and verified scenario may then be used to evaluate contributions of space architectures on outcomes of a wide range of mission types, conducted in desert terrain and with climates and orientation typical of near-equatorial latitudes.  While the Mid-east is still a center of gravity for US military operations, the scenario suffers from the view that, particularly in simulation-assisted operational planning, we are “always fighting the last war”.

 

In conjunction with NE Asia/Korean DPG scenario, this scenario can be used to evaluate simultaneous or serially sequenced Multiple Theater of War (MTW) operations in phases from peacetime operations to build-up and initial entry into either theater (or both), through drawdown and exit from theater(s).

 

Adaptability:

Soviet-style and US-led Coalition force structures and doctrines at theater-level could be readily relocated to any other geographical area on the globe, with appropriate alternative lay-downs and doctrine/tactics made to accommodate specific terrain features.  Selected subsets of force elements and TO&Es at various levels within the theater have been used successfully in vignettes to support a number of programs and demonstrations.

 

Integration/Federation with other models

As in the previous scenario, this and other FORCES scenarios (i.e., DPG Scenario for NE Asia/Korea) may be used in confederated executions with the SLIM Model legacy.

 

Availability: 

The version of this scenario at the DoD SECRET level was used for the Deeply Buried and Hardened Target Defeat study and was delivered to the Office of Space Architect (before it was increased to the SCI control level with the addition of other data and scenario elements by that office).  It may be under CRC control as early as 14 JUL ’00.  There are some minor technical difficulties expected with the external hard drive that was configured as an external boot drive for a different SUN workstation than will be used for this program.  We expect to overcome this glitch within a week of delivery to the CRC facility

 

Source:         Unclassified “DS Ground” – CRC

 

Contact:        Classified SECRET “SWA” - VOLK Field CRTC

                       Major Paul ‘THOR’ Hebner or Capt David Tessmer

                       (608) 427-1419

 

Notes/Comments:

We also expect some minor problems associated with revisions recently made to FORCES database structures to support new applications developed and implemented in support of the SMDC SSNORR, NMD and DTTRA programs. Same issues as in the "DS Air" scenario above.

 


 

4.  DPG NE Asia/ Korea

(UNCLASSIFIED and DoD SECRET/Collateral versions)

 

Technical Applicability:

This is a large-scale, theater-level scenario for representation of defensive air and ground operations against enemy invasion of South Korea across the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).  Primarily used by Deeply Buried and Hardened Target Defeat IPT to determine impact of Chemical-Biological Warfare (CBW) agents, delivered via scuds, on air sortie rates, organizational fighting effectiveness and mission success in the context of warfare on the Korean Peninsula.  Also used by DoD Space Architect at DoD SECRET and SCI levels of database security to evaluate introduction of alternative current and future space-based communications and surveillance architectures and processes on operation outcomes such as force exchange rates, tempo of battle and mission success.

 

Mission Area:

This scenario is based on the Defense Planning Guidance for NE Asia/Korea provided by the DoD J-8 and J-9 offices and is used in support of training, exercise support, systems engineering, architecture evaluation and operations analysis. 

 

Geographic Area: Korean theater with North Korean forces and targets and US, ROK and UN Force elements.

 

Epoch:  Replay of ULCHI FOCUS exercise baseline with vignettes for Littoral (see “Korea_LAE” below), three-division ground force operations with denial of overhead surveillance (see “Korea-blue_wins” and “Korea-Red_wins” below) , and Space Control and Negation (See “SSNOR-bu” scenario below).

 

Relevance and Applicability:

A major feature of this scenario is its force representation at nearly all echelon levels.  The unclassified current version of this scenario is relatively accurate with notional organizations, approximate public literature source force lay-downs and Janes-type parametric representation of systems.  The classified version of this scenario system can be easily reconstructed with the use of data developed at the DoD SECRET level that has been placed under CRC control by the Volk CRTC staff.  Either classified or unclassified version can be made relevant with the addition of current and/or future versions of NTM, upon verification of data parameters used in the representation of the scenario air and ground-force assets, organizations and payloads.  This updated and verified scenario may then be used to evaluate contributions of space architectures on outcomes of a wide range of mission types, conducted in the Korean Peninsula or in other areas with severe terrain and with climates and orientation typical of Korean latitudes.

 

In conjunction with SW Asia DPG scenario, this scenario can be used to evaluate simultaneous or serially sequenced Multiple Theater of War (MTW) operations in phases from peacetime operations to build-up and initial entry into either theater (or both), through drawdown and exit from theater(s).

 

Adaptability:

North Korean force structures and MTO&Es and US-led Coalition force structures and doctrines at theater-level could be readily relocated to any other geographical area on the globe, with appropriate alternative lay-downs and doctrine/tactics made to accommodate specific terrain features.  Selected subsets of force elements and MTO&Es at various levels within the theater have been used successfully in vignettes to support a number of programs and demonstrations.

 

Integration/Federation with other models

As in the previous scenario, this and other FORCES scenarios (i.e., DPG Scenario for SW Asia) may be used in confederated executions with the SLIM Model legacy.

 

Availability: 

The version of this scenario at the DoD SECRET level was used for the Deeply Buried and Hardened Target Defeat study and was delivered to the Office of Space Architect (before it was increased to the SCI control level with the addition of other data and scenario elements by that office).  It has been placed under CRC control as of 14 JUL ’00.  There are some minor technical difficulties expected with the external hard drives that were configured as external boot drives for a different SUN workstations than will be used for this program.  We expect to overcome this glitch within a week or two of delivery to the CRC facility.

 

Source:        

DoD J-8 for DPG representation of Korean/ROK friendly forces; US/Korean Intelligence Estimate (PIE) for North Korean forces including TBMs (NoDong/TDong); Chemical/Biological data from Aberdeen Proving Ground and Kirtland AFB.

 

Contact:        Classified SECRET “SWA” - VOLK Field CRTC

                       Major Paul ‘THOR’ Hebner or Capt. David Tessmer

                       (608) 427-1419

 

Notes/Comments:

We also expect some minor problems associated with revisions recently made to FORCES database structures to support new applications developed and implemented in support of the SMDC SSNORR, NMD and DTTRA scenarios.

 


 

5.  Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OFMTS)/Firesim XXI

(UNCLASSIFIED (Tactical2 Database) and DoD SECRET/Collateral versions)

 

Technical Applicability:

The scenario includes representation of joint counter-offensive air, ground and amphibious assault operations against enemy (Orange Force) elements that have been pushed back into hasty defensive positions above the DMZ, after an invasion of South Korea has been repulsed by Blue forces. Primarily used by the Navy and Marines, the scenario includes Littoral operations, off-carrier Force Protection, surveillance, SEAD air missions and Battlefield Interdiction/Close Air Support missions conducted in support of amphibious Marine assault forces, TLAM and proposed Loitering Cruise Missile systems.  The TLAM, Precision Strike and CM systems were directed at MRLs and Time-Critical Targets moving along North Korean roads deep in the battlespace.

 

Mission Area:

This is based on the Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS)/FireSim XXI, a Navy-approved scenario used recently by the Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren Division (NSWCDD) for High Performance Distributed Computing (HiPer-D) Demo 1999.  It was performed in coordination with the Depth and Simultaneous Attack Battlelab, Ft. Sill, OK, under SETA contract DABT60-97-D-0007.

 

The original scenario has a well-established pedigree.  It was developed by the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) for use in the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV), V-22, and 155mm Lightweight Howitzer COEAs.  Itr was screened and approved by J-8, Director of Force Structure, Resource and Assessment, Joint Staff as an appropriate vehicle for Joint Analyses.

 

The Red force structure for this  scenario is based on the Korea/Us Planning Intelligence Guidance (PIE) and the Blue force structures reflect Defense Planning Guidance for NE Asia/Korea provided by the DoD J-8 and J-9 offices and is used in support of training, exercise support, systems engineering, architecture evaluation and operations analysis. Parts of the timing and some of the scripted events reflect data from replay of the ULCHI FOCUS exercise baseline with vignettes for Littoral Ops (see “Korea_LAE” below), three-division ground force operations with denial of overhead surveillance (see “Korea-blue_wins” and “Korea-Red_wins” below) , and Space Control and Negation (See “SSNOR-bu” scenario below).

 

Geographic Area:

Korean theater with North Korean forces and targets and US, ROK and UN Force elements.

 

Epoch: Relevance and Applicability:

The OMFTS scenario is set in the year 2010.  North Korea (Orange/RED) invades South Korea.  The North Koreans have pushed approximately 60-90 kilometers south of the DMZ.  The Orange offensive is held at this point.  By day 60 of the war, Orange is preparing to renew the offensive along the east coast, massing approximately 200 battalions for a push on the port cities of Pusan and Pohang.

 

To preempt this attack, Allied forces (Blue) are planning to employ OMFTS doctrine to cut off and isolate the attackers.  A landing is planned behind enemy lines to pre-empt Orange attack, isolate forward elements, destroy enemy maneuver force and recapture key terrain.

 

A major feature of this scenario is its force representation at nearly all echelon levels.  The unclassified current version of this scenario is relatively accurate with notional organizations, approximate public literature source force lay-downs and Janes-type parametric representation of systems.  The classified version of this scenario system can be easily reconstructed with the use of data developed at the DoD SECRET level that has delivered to the NSWCDD Theater Battle Arena.  Either classified or unclassified version can be made relevant with the addition of current and/or future versions of NTM, upon verification of data parameters used in the representation of the scenario air and ground-force assets, organizations and payloads.  This updated and verified scenario may then be used to evaluate contributions of space architectures on outcomes of a wide range of mission types, conducted in the Korean Peninsula or in other areas with severe terrain and with climates and orientation typical of Korean latitudes.

 

In conjunction with SW Asia DPG scenario, this scenario can be used to evaluate simultaneous or serially sequenced Multiple Theater of War (MTW) operations in phases from peacetime operations to build-up and initial entry into either theater (or both), through drawdown and exit from theater(s).

 

Adaptability:

North Korean force structures and TO&Es/MTO&Es and US-led Coalition force structures and doctrines at theater-level could be readily relocated to any other geographical area on the globe, with appropriate alternative lay-downs and doctrine/tactics made to accommodate specific terrain features.  Selected subsets of force elements and TO&Es at various levels within the theater have been used successfully in vignettes to support a number of programs and demonstrations.

 

Integration/Federation with other models

As in the previous scenario, this and other FORCES scenarios (i.e., DPG Scenario for SW Asia) may be used in confederated executions with the SLIM Model legacy.

 

Availability: 

The latest and most complete version of this scenario, at the DoD SECRET level, was used for the Land Attack Experiment (LAE) at the Theater Battle Arena in the fall of 1999.  Telephone contact with the system admin. staff at NSWCDD was made on 26 July 2000.  It is believed that the FORCES software and scenario with databases used for the LAE are maintained on dedicated external drives.  As a result of the JWID 2000 exercise, the SUN Ultra 60 used as the FORCES host was reassigned and the location of the external drives that are addressed to this cpu are not known at this time.  Mark Maughn is attempting to locate the se external drives and will contact CRC when he finds them and the SUN machine that they are addressed to.  There are some minor technical difficulties expected with the external hard drives that were configured as external boot drives for a different SUN workstations than will be used for this program.  We expect to overcome this glitch within a week or two of delivery to the CRC facility.

 

 

Source:         DoD J-8 for DPG representation of Korean/ROK friendly forces; US/Korean Intelligence Estimate (PIE) for North Korean forces including TBMs (NoDong/TDong); Chemical/Biological data from Aberdeen Proving Ground and Kirtland AFB.

 

Contact:        CRC now has copy of unclassified Korea_LAE scenario under its control.

 

Notes/Comments: Copy of this scenario has been delivered to the government’s computers as of 7 Aug 2000.

 

 


 

6.  Korea - Land Attack Experiment (LAE)

(UNCLASSIFIED (Tactical2 Database) and DoD SECRET/Collateral versions)

 

Technical Applicability:

The scenario includes the representation of joint counter-offensive air, ground and amphibious assault operations against enemy (Orange Force) elements as described in the OFMTS scenario above.  In addition, force elements of  interest to the Naval Surface Warfare Center/ Dahlgren Division (NSWC/DD) including live, fielded AFATDs and AEGIS systems, TLAM and Precision Strike systems, and Tomahawk Command and Mission Planning System (TCAMPS) prototype systems were directed at MRLs and Time-Critical Targets moving along North Korean roads deep in the battlespace.  Calls-for-fire were generated from tip-offs provided by GUARDRAIL, JSTARS, Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) with communication relays provided by Global Hawk High Altitude Endurance/Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (HAE/UAVs).

 

Mission Area:

This is based on the Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS)/FireSim XXI, a Navy-approved scenario used recently by the Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren Division (NSWCDD) for High Performance Distributed Computing (HiPer-D) Demo 1999.  It was performed in coordination with the Depth and Simultaneous Attack Battlelab, Ft. Sill, OK, under SETA contract DABT60-97-D-0007.

 

The original scenario has a well-established pedigree.  It was developed by the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) for use in the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV), V-22, and 155mm Lightweight Howitzer COEAs.  Itr was screened and approved by J-8, Director of Force Structure, Resource and Assessment, Joint Staff as an appropriate vehicle for Joint Analyses.

 

The Red force structure for this scenario is based on the Korea/Us Planning Intelligence Guidance (PIE).  The Blue force structures reflect Defense Planning Guidance for NE Asia/Korea provided by the DoD J-8 and J-9 offices and is used in support of training, exercise support, systems engineering, architecture evaluation and operations analysis.  Additions were made to the Orange force laydown to support the objectives of the LAE, including Transporter/Erector Launch (TEL) vehicles carrying No Dong SCUD missiles and mobile Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAMs) in an air defense role to provide protection for the TELs. 

 

The TELs move erratically along a mountainous road loop in a manner to avoid detection and tracking by Blue air and ground assets.  TEL routes criss-cross and the vehicles hide in tunnels/culverts and in terrain depressions to mask their movements and operations. Blue has SOF Dragon teams operating in the vicinity of the TELs to provide HUMINT and precision weapon designation/tagging.  Carrier-based fixed wing and rotary aircraft including AWACS, EA-6B, Joint Stars and F-14s and land based F-15C and F-16s conduct  “Wild Weasel” and JSEAD missions and provide battlefield interdiction and tactical close air support to amphibious landing forces.

 

 

 

Geographic Area:

Korean theater with North Korean forces and targets and US, ROK and UN Force elements.

 

Epoch: Relevance and Applicability:

The OMFTS scenario is set in the year 2010.  North Korea (Orange/RED) invades South Korea.  The North Koreans have pushed approximately 60-90 kilometers south of the DMZ.  The Orange offensive is held at this point.  By day 60 of the war, Orange is preparing to renew the offensive along the east coast, massing approximately 200 battalions for a push on the port cities of Pusan and Pohang.

 

To preempt this attack, Allied forces (Blue) are planning to employ OMFTS doctrine to cut off and isolate the attackers.  A landing is planned behind enemy lines to pre-empt Orange attack, isolate forward elements, destroy enemy maneuver force and recapture key terrain.

 

The scenario provided the experiment with ability to evaluate the interfaces and operational capabilities of sensors and mission planning systems, including imagery exploitation , precision targeting, BDA, strike planning, mission planning, re-tasking/diverts, deconfliction, response time and communications connectivity.

 

Either classified or unclassified version can be made relevant with the addition of current and/or future versions of NTM, upon verification of data parameters used in the representation of the scenario air and ground-force assets, organizations and payloads.  This updated and verified scenario may then be used to evaluate contributions of space architectures on outcomes of a wide range of mission types, conducted in the Korean Peninsula or in other areas with severe terrain and with climates and orientation typical of Korean latitudes.

 

In conjunction with SW Asia DPG scenario, this scenario can be used to evaluate simultaneous or serially sequenced Multiple Theater of War (MTW) operations in phases from peacetime operations to build-up and initial entry into either theater (or both), through draw-down and exit from theater(s).

 

Adaptability:

North Korean force structures and TO&Es/MTO&Es and US-led Coalition force structures and doctrines at theater-level could be readily relocated to any other geographical area on the globe, with appropriate alternative lay-downs and doctrine/tactics made to accommodate specific terrain features.  Selected subsets of force elements and TO&Es at various levels within the theater have been used successfully in vignettes to support a number of programs and demonstrations.

 

Integration/Federation with other models

As in the previous scenario, this and other FORCES scenarios (i.e., DPG Scenario for SW Asia) may be used in confederated executions with the SLIM Model legacy.

 

 

 

Availability: 

The latest and most complete version of this scenario, at the DoD SECRET level, was used for the Land Attack Experiment (LAE) at the Theater Battle Arena in the fall of 1999.  Telephone contact with the system admin. staff at NSWCDD was made on 26 July 2000.

 

Source:         Naval Surface Warfare Center/Theater Battle Center, Dahlgren, VA

 

Contact:        CRC now has copy of unclassified Korea LAE scenario under its control.

 

Notes/Comments: Copy of this scenario has been delivered to the government’s computers as of 7 Aug 2000.

 

 

 


 

7.  Bosnia-Hertzgovenia Scenario

(DoD SECRET/Collateral versions)

 

Technical Applicability:

The scenario represents the UN Peacekeeping operation in Eastern Europe in the area that comprised Yugoslavia before the disintegration of the Soviet Bloc.  It was developed for NIMA in order to evaluate air and space intelligence capabilities and processes in the context of a target rich environment comprised of low-signature hostile, neutral and friendly military, paramilitary and civilian units and assets.   The terrain is mountainous and stressing and movement is channeled. Weather conditions present serious problems to sensor operations and management.

 

Mission Area:

The scenario involves routine patrolling of the 20-mile “keep-out” zone where weapons of the warring factions are cached and kept under surveillance by UN Peacekeeping elements.  Air and space surveillance operations are represented that include P-3s, AWACS, EA-3s, U-2s, F-18s with TARPs, Predator and Global Hawks, Joint STARS, GuardRail, and other air surveillance package assets.

 

Serbian forces in small infantry units and low signature vehicles move in and out of the keep-out zone, remove artillery and other weapons, conduct strikes against enemy and UN positions and attempt to return the weapons without detection.  A UN unit in Gorazda is surrounded by Serb force elements that attempt to overrun prepared defensive positions and annihilate the Peacekeeping forces.  The challenge to the overhead surveillance is to detect small unit movement and maneuvers conducted at night and during inclement weather conditions, in a target-rich area.  Situations are presented that require intelligence systems and processes to discriminate and identify hostile Serb elements, with enough time to provide initial warning and to allow reinforcement of the UN outpost before it is overrun by overwhelming numbers of the attacking Serb forces.

 

Geographic Area: Eastern Europe

 

Epoch: Relevance and Applicability:

The scenario is set in the year 1995.  This is a UN Peacekeeping operation involving injection and intercession of UN forces to separate Croat and Serbian warring factions.  The limitations of the collection and intelligence processing with long-haul communications are examined with excursions from the current surveillance operations that assess the contributions of alternative space and air C4ISR to improved situation awareness and improved engagement outcomes.

 

The scenario provided the ability to evaluate the ISR and Intelligence gathering, processing and operational interfaces and capabilities.  Technical capabilities and operations of sensors and mission planning systems, including imagery exploitation, precision targeting, BDA, strike planning, mission planning, re-tasking/diverts, deconfliction, response time and communications connectivity were evaluated.  MOEs and MOPs included metrics on mission success, timeliness of target-to-shooter concepts on targeting accuracy, innovative exploitation of UAV imagery and communications payloads, alternative UAV tasking algorithms, and C4ISR contributions of air and space assets.

Unclassified version can be made relevant with the addition of current and/or future versions of NTM, upon verification of data parameters used in the representation of the scenario air and ground-force assets, organizations and payloads.  This updated and verified scenario may then be used to evaluate contributions of space architectures on outcomes of a wide range of mission types, conducted in Eastern Europe or in other areas with severe terrain and with climates and orientation typical of these latitudes.

 

Adaptability:

Serbian and Croatian force structures and TO&Es/MTO&Es and UN Peacekeeping force structures and doctrines at theater-level could be readily relocated to any other geographical area on the globe, with appropriate alternative lay-downs and doctrine/tactics made to accommodate specific terrain features.

 

Availability: 

The latest and most complete version of this scenario, at the DoD SECRET level, was used for the Land Attack Experiment (LAE) at the Theater Battle Arena in the fall of 1999.  Telephone contact was made on 26 July 2000, with the staff members responsible for system administration at NSWCDD.  It was determined that the external drive used to host the classified version of this scenario was destroyed by a power surge during the last JWIG exercise early this summer.  The scenario was restored from unclassified copies of the tactical2 database maintained by CRC.

 

Source:         Naval Surface Warfare Center/Theater Battle Center  Dahlgren, VA

 

Contact:        CRC now has copy of Korea LAE scenario under its control.

 

Notes/Comments: Copy of this scenario has been delivered to the government’s computers as of 7 Aug 2000.

 


8.  VICTORY FOCUS

(UNCLASSIFIED and DoD SECRET/Collateral versions)

 

Large-scale, theater-level scenario for representation of ground operations involving US and Coalition forces (including “Blueland” and  “Southland” forces) against “Northland” (with its capitol of Baghdad) as a follow up to Operation Desert Shield/Storm.  Primarily used in military exercises including initial FA-40 CPX training course for Army Space Officers.

 

Mission Area:

1.  (U)  SITUATION.

 

a.  (U)  Enemy forces. 

 

(U)  General Situation.  The Republic of Northland (NL) has re-emerged as a major power in the Gulf Region.  After regaining control of NL, the predominately Shiite Baal Party re-established close military ties with Russia, and, in 1997, purchased SCUD and SS-21 TELS along with an unknown quantity of missiles.  This move, and the brutal suppression of nomads and Sunnis in southern Northland, quickly led to a diplomatic cooling between the US and NL.  Also, the US ceased its NL Oil imports and, conversely, increased oil purchases from BLUELAND and The Emirate of Southland.  This further aggravated tensions in the region and caused open, localized hostilities to erupt. In 1999, Baalists accused BLUELAND of repressing Shiites and defaming holy sites.  In December of that year, NL declared the King of BLUELAND a heretic.  In response, the King reduced the number of Northland Shiites allowed into the Kingdom on Pilgrimage to holy sites, triggering large-scale anti-Sunni riots inside NL.  More ominously, NL increased its acquisition of Russian equipment, which is believed now to be stored in depots nation-wide.  In May 2000, Northland’s President suggested turning all BLUELAND Holy Sites into Arab Shrines, causing riots to intensify.  On 10 MAY, BLUELAND Police killed five Shiite rioters after they assaulted the US Embassy, one of whom was a NL Army Captain.  NL and Shiite leaders demanded retribution against the US, which began with a series of terrorist attacks including the Memorial Day bombing of six US airport terminals.  On 25 AUG, NL launched a preemptive attack towards Mecca, Medina and the Shiite centers in BLUELAND with predominately Sunni troops under Shiite leadership.  Desertion and unit defections began as early as D+2 and by 10 SEP the 10INA ceased to exist. The 9TA, also involved in the invasion, was destroyed by BLUELAND defenders and CENTAF air as it reached Medina.  In addition, during their offensive NL launched over fifty CBW armed SCUDs into the region as well as nine CBW terrorist attacks in US subways causing extensive casualties.  During NL’s withdrawal from BLUELAND, a 120-day pause in operations has permitted the US/Coalition forces to position defenses and has allowed NL to fully mobilize its remaining forces.

 

(2)  (U)  Current situation.  (See ANNEX B) The NL defense is currently positioned out of contact with a 50km security zone, 3 x CAAs and 1INA in the 1 Operational Echelon (OE), 1 x CAA in the 2OE, and 1 x TA as a strategic reserve.  The NL 1st OE consists of the 2CAA (the main effort), 5CAA, 1CAA and 8INA.  The 2CAA is composed of two motorized divisions (20 and 21), two tank divisions (24 and 25) and the 2IMRB. The 5CAA is composed of two motorized divisions (50 and 51), two tank divisions (54 and 55) and the 5IMRB. The 1CAA is composed of two motorized divisions (10 and 11), two tank divisions (14 and 15) and the 1IMRB. The 8INA is composed of two infantry divisions (80 and 81), one tank division (84) and one motorized division (82).  The NL 2OE consists of the 3CAA and is composed of two motorized divisions (30 and 31), two tank divisions (34 and 35).  In the strategic reserve, the 4TA is composed of one motorized division (40), three tank divisions (44, 45 and 46) and the 4IMRB. NL’s Air Force retains the capability to conduct attacks against shipping in the Arabian Gulf; ground targets in EASTLAND, SOUTHLAND and BLUELAND; and against US aircraft operating in the region.

 

b.  (U)  Friendly forces.

 

                       (1)  (U)  C/JTF Mission.  On Order, C/JTF conducts offensive operations to defeat NORTHLAND forces to degrade their offensive capability and isolate BAGHDAD to set the conditions for negotiations IAW UNSCR 6-102.  On Order, conduct post hostility operations to restore regional stability.

 

                       (2)  (U)  C/JTF Commander’s Intent. 

 

(a)  (U)  Purpose:  Defeat NORTHLAND’s offensive capability and isolate BAGHDAD to set the conditions for negotiations IAW UNSCR 6-102.

 

(b)  (U)  Key Tasks:

 

1.  (U)  Rapidly generate combat power and transition to the offensive

 

2.  (U)  Defeat NORTHLAND Forces

 

3.  (U)  Isolate BAGHDAD 

 

4.  (U)  Implement UNSCR 6-102

 

5.  (U)  Conduct post hostility operations

 

(c)  (U)  Endstate:  NORTHLAND forces defeated and offensive capability severely degraded, BAGHDAD isolated and US/Coalition forces in position to implement UNSCR 6-102.

 

Corps Commander’s Intent: 

 

(1)  (U)  Purpose:  The purpose of this operation is to portray the C/JFLCC main effort to cause commitment of the 4TA in our zone of action, protect the west flank of the XXIII Airborne Corps (C/JFLCC main effort) and assist in the isolation of BAGHDAD to facilitate transition to peace enforcement operations and set the conditions for stability in the region.

 

(2)  (U)  Key tasks:

 

1.  (U)  Portray the C/JFLCC main effort attack in the west

2.  (U)  Defeat the first operational echelon to cause commitment of the 4TA south of the EUPHRATES River in our zone of action

3.  (U)  Destroy the 1CAA AGRA to facilitate ground maneuver in zone

4.  (U)  Defeat the 4TA to prevent commitment against the XXIII ABC.  The 4TA fight is the decisive fight which will allow the Corps to protect the flank of XXIII ABC and facilitate securing key terrain necessary to control the western avenues of approach into BAGHDAD.  The defeat of the 45TD is the decisive point for defeating the 4TA because it allows the Corps to envelop the 4TA from the east and provides the most expeditious avenues to secure key terrain to control the west avenues of approach to BAGHDAD.

5.  (U)  The decisive point for isolating BAGHDAD is the defeat of the 34TD vicinity AL FALLUJAH and securing western avenues of approach to the west of BAGHDAD.  Retaining control of these avenues allows the Corps to set the conditions for peace enforcement operations IAW UNSCR 6-102.

 

(3)  (U)  Endstate:  First operational echelon and 4TA defeated, BAGHDAD is isolated from the west, C/JFLCC main effort (XXIII ABC) attacks unimpeded by the Front Commander’s strategic reserve and V (US) Corps occupies positions between PL LEAD and PL GOLD.

 

(U)     Concept of operations. 

At H-Hour, V (US) Corps attacks in zone to penetrate the 1CAA’s first tactical echelon in order to cause the Front Commander to commit the 4TA in our zone of action allowing the C/JFLCC Main Effort (XXIII ABC) to attack in zone at H+24 unhindered by the enemy strategic reserve.  V (US) Corps supports the C/JFLCC deception plan to cause the commitment of the 4TA by portraying the C/JFLCC main effort.  The deep attack focus is to destroy the 1CAA ARAG and AAG with attack helicopters to facilitate ground maneuver in zone.  Air interdiction focus is on defeating flank tank divisions in the second tactical echelon in order to allow the Corps to focus combat power during the penetration.  The Corps attacks with three divisions abreast.  1ID(M) attacks in the west to defeat enemy forces to protect the flank of the main effort, 3ID(M).  1AD attacks in the east to defeat enemy forces to facilitate the 3ID(M) penetration and protects the Corps east flank.  3ID(M), the main effort, attacks to penetrate the first tactical echelon and defeat the 14TD in the second tactical echelon in order to portray success in the Corps zone, cause commitment of the 4TA and secure key terrain to fight the 4TA, the corps decisive fight.  2ACR screens the Corps east flank to provide early warning.  The Corps maintains one attack helicopter squadron in reserve and one mechanized task force as the TCF.

Upon completion of the defeat of the first operational echelon, the Corps continues the attack to defeat the 4TA, the Corps decisive fight.  Deep attack focus shifts to destruction of the 4TA ARAG to facilitate maneuver in zone.  Air interdiction focus is on defeat of second echelon divisions of the 4TA, the 17IMRD and destruction of bridging assets.  The Corps attacks with two divisions abreast to defeat the 4TA first echelon divisions and fix second echelon divisions.  1ID(M) attacks in the west to defeat enemy forces and protect the flank of 3ID(M), the Corps main effort.  3ID(M), the main effort, attacks to defeat the 45TD, the decisive fight, to cause culmination of the 4TA attack.  1AD follows and is prepared to attack to defeat the 34TD vicinity AL FALLUJAH and secure key terrain to assist in the isolation of BAGHDAD.

 

(U)  Maneuver.  V (US) Corps executes the C/JFLCC Phase III (Offensive Operations) in five stages: Stage A (Preparation for Combat), Stage B (Security Zone Fight), Stage C (First Operational Echelon Fight), Stage D (4TA Fight), and Stage E (Transition).

 

Stage A (Preparation for Combat) (Prior to H-Hour).  This stage begins with V (US) Corps occupying Corps and Division assembly areas.  V (US) Corps portrays the C/JFLCC main effort by integrating 102ID (AASLT), the theater reserve, into Corps preparations for combat, both logistically and tactically.  Additional deception efforts will focus on aggressive reconnaissance in force, artillery raids and demonstrations.  2ACR, the Corps main effort, screens along PL OHIO until H-12 then repositions and screens the Corps east flank.  Air interdiction focus is on the 24TD, 15TD, 14TD and the 4TA. Subordinate units occupy assembly areas, conduct local security operations and prepare for combat.  1ID(M) occupies AA CHICAGO, 3ID(M) occupies AA BUFFALO, 1AD occupies AA DALLAS and 11 AHR occupies AA TACOMA.  The Corps reserve, an Attack Helicopter Squadron (AHS), occupies AA TACOMA with priority of commitment to reinforce 2ACR.  One MECH TF from 1ID(M) and a UH-60 company from the 12 AVN BDE occupies AA RENO as the Corps TCF.  Units preposition logistics and security forward to facilitate maneuver.  This stage ends with V (US) Corps attacking in zone across PL OHIO, the LD at H-Hour.

 

(U)  Stage B (Security Zone Fight) (H-Hour to H+24).  This stage begins with V (US) Corps attacking in zone across the LD at H-Hour to collapse the security zone.  Air Interdiction focus continues on the 24TD, 15TD, 14TD and the 4TA.  The deep attack focus is to destroy the 1CAA ARAG and 2CAA AAG.   The CAS focus is the IMRBs in the security zone.  The Corps attacks with three divisions abreast to portray the C/JFLCC main effort.  In the west, 1ID(M) attacks in zone to defeat security zone forces to protect the flank of 3ID(M), the Corps main effort.  In the east, 1AD attacks to defeat security zone forces to protect the flank of 3ID(M), the Corps main effort.  3ID(M), the Corps main effort, attacks to defeat security zone forces to facilitate deep attacks and maneuver in zone.  2ACR continues to screen the Corps east flank to provide early warning.  The Corps reserve, one AHS from 11AHR, priority of commitment is to reinforce the main effort.  This stage ends with V (US) Corps beginning the attack to penetrate the first tactical echelon main defense belt vicinity PL GOLD.

 

(U)  Stage C (First Operational Echelon Fight) (H+24 to H+66).  This stage begins with the V (US) Corps attack to penetrate the first tactical echelon main defensive belt with three Divisions abreast.  The focus of Corps deep attacks is to destroy the 1CAA AAG and ARAG.  Air Interdiction focus shifts to the 14TD, 24TD, 15TD, 17IMRD, and the 4TA.  The mass CAS focus is on the 11MRD at the point of 3ID(M)’s penetration, then shifts to massing on the 14TD.  1ID(M) (SE) attacks to defeat the 10MRD and the 15TD to protect the flank of 3ID(M) (ME).  1AD (Supporting Effort) attacks to defeat elements of the 11MRD to facilitate 3ID(M) (ME) penetration and to protect the Corps east flank.  3ID(M) (ME) attacks to penetrate the 11MRD and defeat the 14TD to cause commitment of the 4TA and facilitate maneuver against the 4TA.  2ACR continues to screen the Corps east flank to provide early warning.   One AHS is the Corps reserve with priority of commitment to reinforce the Corps ME.  This stage ends with the defeat of the second tactical echelon tank divisions vicinity PL IRON.

 

(U)  Stage D (4TA Fight) (H+66 to H+90).  This stage begins with the defeat of the first operational echelon’s second tactical echelon tank divisions.  The Corps continues the attack to defeat the 4TA with two divisions abreast and one division following.  The focus of Corps deep attack is to destroy the 4TA ARAG and destroy one of the lead brigades of the 17IMRD to deny the enemy’s ability to mass combat power.  Air Interdiction focus is on the 17IMRD, 40MRD and 46TD to deny the enemy’s ability to mass combat power.  The initial focus of mass CAS is on the Corps decisive fight, the 45TD, then shifts to the 46TD.  1ID(M) (SE) attacks to defeat the 44TD and fix the 17IMRD to protect the flank of the Corps main effort, 3ID(M).  Initially the Corps main effort, 3ID(M) attacks to defeat the 45TD, the Corps decisive fight.  After the defeat of the 45TD, 3ID(M), as a supporting effort, attacks to fix the 40MRD to protect the flank of 1AD (ME).  1AD follows 3ID(M) and is prepared to attack, as the Corps main effort, to defeat the 34TD vicinity AL FALLUJAH and secure key terrain to assist in the isolation of BAGHDAD (OBJ SAW).  On order, 2ACR repositions to guard the Corps east flank between PL UTAH and PL GEORGIA to protect the Corps east flank.  The Corps reserve, one AHS, initial priority of commitment is to defeat the 17IMRD, then reinforce 1ID(M).  This stage ends with the defeat of the 4TA, the seizure of key terrain and the isolation of BAGHDAD from the west.

 

(U)  Stage E (Transition) (H+90+).  This stage begins with the defeat of the 4TA, the seizure of key terrain and the isolation of BAGHDAD.  The Corps continues to attack in zone to gain positional advantage over the enemy and is prepared to transition to peace enforcement operations.  The focus of Corps deep attacks is to deny the enemy’s ability to mass combat power.  Air Interdiction focus is the 31MRD.  The focus of mass CAS is 31MRD and 34TD.  1ID(M) (SE) attacks to secure key terrain vicinity OBJ DRILL to protect the Corps west flank.  3ID(M) (SE) attacks to secure key terrain vicinity OBJ AX to assist in the isolation of BAGHDAD and protect the flank of 1AD, the Corps main effort.  1AD (ME) consolidates vicinity OBJ SAW to secure key terrain to isolate BAGHDAD from the west and protect the flank of XXIII ABC, the C/JFLCC main effort.  The Corps reserve is one AHS with a priority of commitment to reinforce 1AD (ME).  This stage ends upon change of mission from C/JFLCC.

 

Geographic Area: Mid-east Theater with Iraqi forces, objectives and targets

 

Epoch:  Ten years after Operation Desert Shield/Storm baseline with excursions out to 2010-2015 for selected force elements and architectures.

 

Relevance and Applicability:

This scenario was developed to accomplish several specific training objectives and respond to specific requirements:

  Create the environment for 1ID and 1AD to plan and execute decisive ground combat operations across all battlefield operating systems and throughout their battlespace.

 

  Create a training environment that:

  Forces the divisions to fight against a free thinking OPFOR where the outcome is not assured and tactical consequences are fully played out.

   Enforces rigor by maintaining high standards of realism throughout the exercise.

   Focuses on a JSCP area of operations.

   Requires the integration and synchronization of Information Operations, Air Space Management, and Air and Ground Operations.

 

  Train Divisions to integrate Air and Ground Operations into a successful scheme of maneuver using joint planning and execution processes to maximize effects and capabilities of each Services’ forces.

 

  Train on CENTCOM and ARCENT SOPs and JTTPs.

 

  Leverage divisions’ WFX to train the Corps Command Posts and MSCs in conventional combat operations (large unit movement, deliberate & hasty attack, mobile and area defense)

–   Synchronize and sustain Corps operations.

   Synchronize Corps deep operations with the close fight

   Protect the force.

   Integrate lessons learned from recent operational experience

     for the exercise and to shape future training.

 

  Set conditions for the close battle through integrated operations.

–   Transition from movement to maneuver.

–   Integrate SOF and USAF.

  Coordinate supply and engineering to support units.

 

Represent input from Space collectors.  The V Corps Space Support will provide technical space expertise, products, and analysis to the corps staff and subordinate commands by means of integration in the Corps staff planning and execution of the OPLAN. 

 

A major feature of this scenario is its force representation at nearly all echelon levels.  The unclassified current version of this scenario is relatively accurate with notional organizations, approximate public literature source force lay-downs and Janes-type parametric representation of systems.  The classified version of this scenario system can be easily reconstructed with the use of data developed at the DoD SECRET level that has been placed under CRC control by the Volk CRTC staff.  Either classified or unclassified version can be made relevant with the addition of current and/or future versions of NTM, upon verification of data parameters used in the representation of the scenario air and ground-force assets, organizations and payloads.  This updated and verified scenario may then be used to evaluate contributions of space architectures on outcomes of a wide range of mission types, conducted in the Korean Peninsula or in other areas with severe terrain and with climates and orientation typical of Korean latitudes.

 

Adaptability:

Soviet-style and US-led Coalition force structures and doctrines at theater-level could be readily relocated to any other geographical area on the globe, with appropriate alternative lay-downs and doctrine/tactics made to accommodate specific terrain features.  Selected subsets of force elements and TO&Es at various levels within the theater have been used successfully in vignettes to support a number of programs and demonstrations.

 

Integration/Federation with other models

This and other FORCES scenarios (i.e., DPG Scenario for NE Asia/Korea) may be used in confederated executions with the SLIM Model legacy.  

 

Availability: 

The version of this scenario at the DoD SECRET level was used for support of military exercises including initial FA-40 CPX training course for Army Space Officers and was delivered to the SMDC/FDIC organization. It has been placed under CRC control as of 14 JUL ’01.

 

 

 

References: 

C/JTF OPORD 01-01, 011500 NOV 00.

 

C/JFLCC OPORD 01-03, 171700 NOV 00.

 

Map reference for area of interest/area of operations: 

 

33o00’N, 42o00’E

38SKB3050

33o00’N, 49o30’E

39SUS5040

28o00’N, 42o00’E

39RUL5090

28o00’N, 49o30’E

38RKR0000

 

Contact:        Terry Nelson or John Coons

SMDC Battle Lab West

                       Colorado Springs, Colorado

 

Notes/Comments:

None